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A DANGEROUS PREOCCUPATION WITH
FUTURE DANGER: WHY EXPERT
PREDICTIONS OF FUTURE
DANGEROUSNESS IN CAPITAL CASES ARE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Abstract: In Furman v. Georgia, the United States Supreme Court held
that it was unconstitutional to administer the death penalty upon the
sole, unguided discretion of juries. In response to Furman, some states
amended their statutes to suggest or require that a jury assess the
defendant's future dangerousness before issuing a death sentence.
Generally, this assessment is based on psychiatric expert testimony. This
author explores the reliability and accuracy of psychiatric expert
testimony of future dangerousness in light of the Court's more recent
Barefoot v. Estelle and Dauber, v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals decisions.
The author argues that because the death penalty is so extreme and
utterly final, heightened standards of reliability and accuracy should be
used when determining the admissibility of evidence at the sentencing
phases of capital trials.
INTRODUCTION
In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia, the United States Supreme Court.
determined that it was unconstitutional to administer the death pen-
alty upon the sole, unguided discretion of juries) The Court reasoned
in part that this abdication to juries necessarily produced arbitrary
and capricious results; therefore, it violated the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment as applied to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendinent. 2
 Immediately following this de-
1 See 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972) (per curiam); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
The Court wrote a per curiam opinion which very briefly stated the holding; the five jus-
tices which made up the plurality then delineated their interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment inn five separate concur-
ring opinions. See id. at 239 (per curiam); id. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 257
(Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310 (Whited., concur-
ring); id. at 314 (Marshall, J., concurring).
2 Ste M. at 239 (per curiam); id. at 295 (Brennan, J., concurring). The Eighth Amend-
ment provides that excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
207
208	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 44:207
cision, death penalty states scrambled to amend their death penalty
statutes to comply with Furman.3
Some states responded to the Furman decision by amending their
statutes to suggest or require that a jury determine the defendant's
future dangerousness. 4 Other states relied on the Model Penal Code
scheme—a system which guides jury deliberations by asking jurors to
weigh aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances in
order to determine whether to impose a sentence other than death. 5
Suggesting or even forcing the jury to find future dangerousness
causes the prosecution to rely heavily on the most popular means of
proving future dangerousness: psychiatric expert testimony. 6 The ar-
guments against this form of evidence are that it is inaccurate, unreli-
able, and inordinately prejudicial.?
One particularly prolific psychiatric expert who is repeatedly
mentioned in Supreme Court cases and capital cases in Texas is Dr.
James P. Grigson, commonly dubbed "Dr. Death." 8 As of 1994, Dr.
Grigson had appeared in at least 150 capital trials on behalf of the
state, and his predictions of future dangerousness had been used to
help convict at least one-third of all Texas death row inmates. 9
What is most remarkable about Dr. Grigson, however, is not his
extensive record of making determinations of future dangerousness
for the State of Texas, but the striking similarity of his diagnoses as
well as his remarkable confidence in his ability to predict the future.°
3 Sec Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating- Parlors: The Paradox of Today's Ar-
bitrary and Mandatory Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 Wm. & MARY Btu, R•s. J. 345, 352-53
(1998).
4 See Jonathan R. Sorensen, Ph.D., Criminology: An Actuarial Risk Assessment of Violence
Posed By Capital Murder Defendants, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1251, 1252 (2000).
See Shelley Clarke, Note, A Reasoned Moral Response: Rethinking Texas's Capital Sentenc-
ing Statute After Penry Lynagh, 69 TEst. L. REv. 407, 409-10 (1990).
6 See Mark David Albertson, Can Violence Be Predicted! Future Dangerousness: The Testimony
of Experts in Capital Cases, 3-NITR GRtm, JusT. 18, 19 (1989); Brock Mehler, The Supreme
Court and State Psychiatric Examinations of Capital Defendants: Stuck Inside of jurek with the
Barefoot Blues Again, 59 UMKC L. REV, 107, 110 (1990).
7 See infra notes 187-242 and accompanying text.
B See Bennett v. Texas, 766 S.N .V.2d 227, 231 (1989) (Teague, J., dissenting) (explaining
that Dr. Grigson earned the nickname "Dr. Death" because he frequently testified in capi-
tal cases on behalf of state with successful results); Kirchmeier, supra note 3, at 372; TEXAS
DEFENDER SERVICE, A STATE OF DENIAL: TEXAS JUSTICE. AND THE DEATH PENALTY 26,
available at http://www.texasdefender.org/study/chapter3.hunl (last visited Apr. 11, 2002)
(stating Texas prosecutors have used Dr. Grigson's testimony extensively despite his ques-
tionable reputation).
9 See Kirchmeier, supra note 3, at 372.
10 See Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 259-60 (1988) (noting Dr. Grigson .stated
unequivocally that in his expert opinion defendant would be continuing threat to society;
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Despite clear concern on the part of the psychiatric community re-
garding the inability of psychiatric professionals to accurately predict
future dangerousness, Dr. Grigson has testified repeatedly that he was
one hundred percent. certain that the defendant would be dangerous
in the fliture;" that he could testify to this fact "within reasonable psy-
chiatric certainiy;"12
 and, in some cases, that there was "a one thousand
percent chance" that the defendant would be a future danger."
Such certainty has impressed so many juries and helped to con-
vict so many defendants that one judge sitting on the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals wrote:
[W] hen DI-. Grigson speaks to a lay jury ... about a person
who he characterizes as a "severe" sociopath ... the defen-
dant should stop what he is doing and commence writing
out his last will and testament—because he will in all prob-
ability soon be ordered by the trial judge to suffer a prema-
ture death.... When Dr. Grigson is shown to have testified
in a capital murder case in which the defendant challenges
his conviction and sentence of death, the captions of those
cases in which relief was granted read almost like the follow-
ing: "THIS IS ANOTHER DR. GRIGSON CASE." The num-
ber of these cases is so great that I will simply refer the
reader to either Westlaw or Lexis and not cite them."
that defendant was as severe a sociopath as you can be;" that on scale of one to ten, where
ten indicated complete disregard for human life, defendant was ten; and that defendant
was beyond the reach of psychiatric rehabilitation); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 919
(1983) (Blackmun,,)., dissenting) (quoting Dr. Grigson as testifying that the defendant was
in the "most severe category" of sociopaths meaning that on a scale of one to ten, defen-
dant was "above ten;" that whether defendant was in society at large or in a prison society
there was a "one bundled potent and absolute" chance that defendant would commit future
violent acts); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1981) (noting that Dr. Grigson
testified that defendant was "a very severe sociopath:" that he will continue his behavior
and his sociopathic condition will "only get worse;" that defendant has "no regard for an-
other human being's property or for their life, regardless of who it may be;" that there is
no treatment or medicine that would change defendant's behavior; and that defendant
had no remorse or sorrow for his actions); Texas Defender Service, supra note 8, at 32
(describing Dr, Grigson's testimony in Randall Dale Adams case wherein Dr. Grigson
stated that on scale of sociopathy, Adams was at worst end of the scale; that there was noth-
ing that could change the defendant; that Adams had no regard for the lives or property
of others, whoever they might be; and that Adams would continue to threaten society).
Kirchmeier, supra note 3, at 372.
13 Barefoot, 463 U.S, at 918.
13
 Texas Defender Service, supra note 8, at 30.
14
 Bennett, 766 S.W.2d at 232 (Teague, J., dissenting).
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Dr. Grigson has been proven wrong in several cases, the most no-
table being that of Randall Dale Adams whom Dr. Grigson described
as an incurable and extreme sociopath with no regard for the life or
property of others and who would continue to present a danger to
society. 0 Due mainly to Errol Morris's documentary The Thin Blue
Line, Adams was exonerated of all charges after twelve years of impris-
onment and released from the Texas death row. 16 Not once in his
twelve years of imprisonment, nor in the years since his release, has
Adams committed a known act of violence. 17 Yet this evidence has not
changed Dr. Grigson's mind: Adams, Dr. Grigson asserts, will kill
again. 18
In 1995, Dr. Grigson was expelled from the American Psychiatric
Association (APA) and from the Texas Society of Psychiatric Phsy-
icians (TSPP). 19 The APA and the TSPP determined that Dr. Grigson's
testimony in several cases that he could be one hundred percent cer-
tain that the defendant would be dangerous in the future was a viola-
tion of ethics which could not be tolerated." Despite this condemna-
tion, Dr. Grigson continues to be appointed by Texas courts to make
psychiatric evaluations of defendants and continues to predict future
dangerousness of defendants for the State of Texas. 21 He has now en-
tered into his third decade of psychiatric determinations of future
dangerousness.22
The case of Dr. Grigson provides just one powerful example of
how arbitrariness and caprice still exist in capital sentencing schemes
which require the jury to determine whether the defendant will be
dangerous in the future—and allow psychiatric experts to present tes-
timony to this effect."
See Texas Defender Service, supra note 8, at 32-35.
'6 Sec id. at 32-33.
See id.
18 Paul C. Giannelli, Junk Science": The Criminal Cases, 84 J. Glum. L. & CRINIINOLOGY
105,116 (1993).
to Kirchmeier, supra note 3, at 372.
20 See Texas Defender Service, supra note 8, at 29-30.
21 See id. at 31-33.
22 Sec id. at 28.
25
 This Note will argue specifically that psychiatric expert determinations of future
dangerousness are unconstitutional. Other methods of questionable constitutionality are
also used in some states, but will not be discussed here. One such method is the use of the
defendant's prior tmadjudicated offenses to indicate future violence. For a more in-depth
discussion of the other methods used to prove a defendant's future danger to society see
generally Steven Paul Smith, Unreliable and Prejudicial: The Use of Extraneous Unadjudicated
Offenses in the Penalty Phases of Capital Trials, 93 COLUNI. L. Rur. 1249 (1993), and Jason J.
Solomon, Note, Future Dangerousness: Issues and Analysis, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 55 (1999).
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Part I of this Note will re-examine the Supreme Court's Eighth
Amendment doctrine regarding the death penalty by revisiting each
of the landmark cases to illustrate how the early cases called for an
end to arbitrary administration of the death penalty as well as for ac-
curacy and reliability in sentencing information. 21
 Part II will examine
the case of Barefoot v. Estelle to reveal how the Court's initial interpreta-
tion of the requirements of the Eight. Amendment. appears to have
changed by allowing inherently unreliable evidence to be considered
at death penalty sentencing hearings. 25
 This Part will then explore the
Court's more recent Dauber! v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals decision to
determine what that opinion's emphasis on reliability in expert testi-
mony might mean in the context. of death penalty adjudications."
Part III will next examine the use of future dangerousness as an ag-
gravating factor in capital cases. 27
 This Part will discuss the pervasive
use of psychiatric predictions to prove future dangerousness as well as
how and why juries rely on expert testimony of this kind. 25 This Part
will also examine the evidence that suggests that psychiatric predic-
tions of future dangerousness are unreliable.° In addition, Part III
will provide two examples of states which do not consider future
dangerousness as an aggravating factor in capital cases." Finally, Part
IV will argue that the states which consider future dangerousness in
sentencing phases of death penalty trials, and allow juries to hear psy-
chiatric predictions of future dangerousness, continue to violate the
Eighth Amendment by encouraging the use of unreliable and inaccu-
rate testimony which misguides juries and leads to arbitrary and ca-
pricious results:31
1. UNRAVELING THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT WITH REGARD TO THE
DEATH PENALTY: THE SUPREME COURT CASES
Since its 1972 decision in Furman. v. Georgia, the Supreme Court
has attempted to clarify what will and will not be acceptable in a death
penalty statute. 32
 Because death is different from any length of prison
24 Sec infra notes 32-103 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 106-145 and accompanying text.
26
 Sec infra notes 146-174 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 175-251 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 175-211 and accompanying text.
29 Sec infra notes 212-242 and accompanying text.
° Sec infra notes 243-251 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 252-304 and accompanying text.
32 See Kirchmeier, supra note 3, at 346.
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term, there is a particular need for reliability in the factors that de-
termine whether the sentence of death is appropriate." The death
penalty may not be arbitrarily or capriciously meted out. 34 The sen-
tencer must have guided discretion rather than unfettered discretion
in the imposition of the death penalty."
On the other hand, there can be no mandatory death sentences
for certain crimes; the state may not take complete control of sentenc-
ing after the defendant has been found guilty of a death-penalty-
eligible crime . 36 There must be individualized sentencing, meaning
that the sentencer must be able to consider any mitigating facts that
the defendant may present. 37
What satisfies the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment remains unclear, however." The Supreme
Court's doctrine has been called "pathologically incomprehensible." 39
A more generous description of the doctrine refers to it as a "confus-
ing array of ill-defined concepts, conflicting pronouncements, ipse
dixits, and short-lived precedents." 4°
A. The Supreme Court Weighs In: Furman v. Georgia
In 1972, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Furman U Geor-
gia to determine whether the imposition and enforcement the death
penalty in the three cases before the Court constituted a violation of
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments:" In Furman, two of the de-
fendants were convicted of rape and a third was convicted of murder;
conviction for these crimes was punishable by death. 42 All three were
sentenced under statutes which left the decision of whether to impose
death or a lighter sentence up to the jury without articulating any
standards by which the jury should exercise this discretion.°
93 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,305 (1976).
si Sec Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,309-10 (1972) (Stewart, j., concurring).
35 See id.
36 Sec Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303-05.
37 Sec id. at 304.
313 Sec Clarke, supra note 5, at 416-23.
39 See id. at 418-19.
40 Sec id. at 416-18.
41 408 U.S. 238,239 (1972). The Furman decision included three death penalty cases
from two states in which the jury was given unfettered discretion in deckling whether to
grant the death penalty or a lesser sentence. See id. at 239 (per curia►); id. at 253 (Doug-
las, J., concurring).
45 Id. at 252,253 (Douglas, J., concurring).
43 Id. at 240,253 (Douglas, J., concurring),
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The Court held that allowing juries to use this unfettered discre-
tion in determining whether to impose death or life in prison was
cruel and unusual punishment violative of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.'" For an understanding of the Court's interpretation of
the Eighth Amendment with regard to the death penalty, however,
one must turn to the five concurring opinions filed in the case.45
In his concurrence, Justice Douglas explained that the Court did
not hold the death penalty to be unconstitutional in and of itself un-
less the manner of execution is especially heinous:ffi Rather, it seemed
to interpret. the Eighth Amendment as drawing its meaning from "the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society."47
 Here, there was a violation because the death penalty as
administered in Furman, by juries with untrammeled discretion, led to
a necessarily arbitrary and capricious result; because the juries were
given no standards, the decisions were essentially dependent on the
whims of twelve people. 48
Justice Brennan reiterated the Supreme Court's interpretation in
his concurrence stating, "the very words 'cruel and unusual punish-
ments' imply condemnation of the arbitrary infliction of severe pun-
ishments."49
 Justice Brennan also emphasized that death was a unique
punishment in the United States because of its severity and finality;
this difference has historically resulted in the Court treating the death
penalty differently than other punishments administered throughont
the country.5°
Justice Stewart added that "Whese death sentences are cruel and
unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and
unusual the petitioners are among a capriciously selected random
handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been im-
posed."" Justice Stewart discerned no basis, aside from the possible
impermissible consideration of race, for the selection of the particular
petitioners to receive the death penalty when so many others con-
" See id, at 239-40 (per curiam).
45
 The per curiam opinion stated only the holding of the case with no explanation of
the Court's reasoning. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40.
46 Sec id. at 241 (Douglas, J., concurring).
47 Id. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Trop v, Dulles, 356 U.S, 86, 101
(1958)),
48 Sec id. at 241-42, 253 (Douglas, J., concurring).
411
 Sec id. at 274 (Brennan, J., concurring).
5U See F 14 roan, 408 U.S. at 286-88 (Brennan, J., concurring).
51 See id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
214	 Boston College Law Review 	 'Vol. 44:207
victed of rape and murder had not received the same penalty for the
same crimes.52
As a result of Furman, all death penalty statutes in existence in
1972 were discarded or revised in order to comply with the Court's
abolition of standardless jury discretion regarding the imposition of
the death penalty"
B. Following up Furman
Because the Supreme Court had not closed the door by declaring
the death penalty unconstitutional in Furman, many death penalty
states revised or created new death penalty statutes which gave juries
some guidance in the imposition of the death penalty. 54 These statutes
were eventually challenged in several states, and, on July 2, 1976, the
Supreme Court heard four cases which presented four states' re-
sponses to the mandate of Funnan, 55
1. Gregg v. Georgia
In 1976, in Gregg v. Georgia, the Supreme Court upheld Georgia's
revised death penalty statute which allowed the jury to impose death
or life in prison after considering evidence of both statutory aggravat-
ing circumstances as well as mitigating circumstances," This statute
called for these circumstances to be examined during a sentencing
hearing after the defendant was found guilty of a capital crime at
trial. 57 A defendant may only be given the death penalty if the jury
finds at least one of ten statutory aggravating factors beyond a reason-
able doubt, and the defendant will be given substantial latitude in the
presentation of mitigating evidence."
52 Sec id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
" Sec Kirchmeier, supra note 3, at 352-53.
54 Sec a at 352.
55 Sec Clarke, supra note 5, at 409.
56 See 428 U.S. 153,163-64 (1976).
57 Sec id.
Id. at 164,165. The ten aggravating factors were: (1) The offense of murder, rape,
armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed by a person with a prior record of convic-
don for a capital felony, or the offense of murder was committed by a person who has a
substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions; (2) The offense of murder,
rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed while the offender was engaged in the
commission of another capital felony, or aggravated battery, or the offense of murder was
committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of burglary or arson in the
first degree; (3) The offender by his act of murder, armed robbery, or kidnapping knosv-
ingly created a great risk of death to more than one person in a public place by means of a
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In Greg; the defendant was found guilty of armed robbery and
murder.59
 During the penalty phase of the trial, neither side offered
any mitigating or aggravating evidence, but the judge instructed the
jury that it would not be authorized to impose the death penalty un-
less it found one of the statutory aggravating circumstances beyond a
reasonable doubto The jury found two aggravating circumstances
and returned a verdict of death.° 1
The Court reiterated its verdict in Furman stating "that where dis-
cretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the de-
termination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that
discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the
risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action."62
The majority further emphasized that discretion in the area of
sentencing should be exercised in an informed manner based on ac-
curate infant ta tion: 63
If an experienced trial judge, who daily faces the difficult
task of imposing sentences, has a vital need for accurate in-
formation about a defendant and the crime he committed in
order to be able to impose a rational sentence in the typical
criminal case, then accurate sentencing information is an
indispensable prerequisite to a reasoned determination of
weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one per-
son; (4) The offender committed the offense of murder for himself or another, for the
purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value; (5) The murder of a
judicial officer, former judicial officer, district attorney or solicitor or former district attor-
ney or solicitor during or because of the exercise of his official duty; (6) The offender
caused or directed another to commit murder or committed murder as the agent or em-
ployee of another person; (7) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping
was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, deprav-
ity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim; (8) The offense of murder was commit-
ted against any peace officer, corrections employee or fireman while engaged in the per-
formance of his official duties; (9) The offense of murder was committed by a person in,
or who has escaped From, the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful
confinement; and (10) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfer-
ing with, or preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement, of him-
self or another. Id. at 166 n.9.
59 Id. at 160,
e" Gregg, 428 U.S. at 160-61.
61 Id, at 161.
65 hi. at 189.
65 See id,
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whether a defendant shall live or die by a jury of people who
may never before have made a sentencing decision. 64
The Georgia scheme was accepted by the Court as sufficiently limiting
and directing the discretion of the jury so as to minimize the risk of
wholly arbitrary and capricious action. 65 The new statute adequately
prevented the jury from "wantonly and freakishly impos[ing] the
death sentence. "66
2. Proffitt v. Florida
On the same day, in Proffitt v. Florida, the Supreme Court upheld
the Florida death penalty statute which, like the Georgia statute, re-
quired a sentencing hearing where the jury would hear relevant evi-
dence relating to certain legislatively-outlined aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances.° At the conclusion of the hearing, the jury
would make a recommendation to the judge whether to impose death
or life in prison. 68 The judge would then consider the jury's recant-
mendation and render the final decision. 69
64 Id. at 190,
65 Sec Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189, 206-07.
" Id. at 207.
87 See 428 U.S. 242, 248, 260 (1976). The aggravating circumstances were: (a) The
capital felony was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment; (b) The de-
fendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or felony involving the use or
threat of violence to the person; (c) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death
to many persons; (d) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged,
or in flight after committing or attempting to commit, or WAS an accomplice, in the com-
mission of, or an attempt to commit, any robbery, rape, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or
aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or
bomb; (e) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a
lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody; (f) The capital felony was committed for
pecuniary gain; (g) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exer-
cise of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws; (h) The capital felony was
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. Id. at 250 n.6. The mitigating circumstances are: (a)
The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity; (b) The capital felony
was committed while the defendant was under the iulluence of extreme mental or e/110-
tional disturbance; (c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or con-
sented to the act; (d) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony committed by
another person and his participation was relatively minor; (e) The defendant acted under
extreme duress or tinder the substantial domination of another person; (f) The capacity of
the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
the requirements of law was substantially impaired; (g) The age of the defendant at the
time of the crime. Id.
68 Sec id. at 248-49.
69 See id. at 249-50.
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Here, the defendant was found guilty of first degree murder."
During the sentencing hearing, the jury heard evidence that the de-
fendant had a prior conviction for breaking and entering. 71 They were
also told that the defendant. had confessed to a doctor in jail that he
had an uncontrollable desire to kill and wanted treatment. so
 that. he
would not kill again." The doctor testified that lie did think the de-
fendant. would be a danger to his fellow inmates, but that his condi-
tion could be treated with success." The jury then returned an advi-
sory verdict which recommended a sentence of death. 74
 The judge
then ordered a psychiatric evaluation of the defendant, which indi-
cated that he was not mentally impaired at. the time of the crime. The
judge then imposed the death penalty, finding four aggravating cir-
cumstances and no mitigating circumstances." The Court found that.
because the statute gave the triers of fact "specific and detailed guid-
ance to assist them in deciding whether to impose the death penalty,"
Florida had established a "meaningful basis for distinguishing the few
cases in which (the death penalty) [was] imposed from the many
cases in which it [was] not."'"
3. Woodson. v. North Carolina
In 1976, in Woodson v. North Carolina," the day's third case, the
Supreme Court examined North Carolina's death penalty statute
which attempted to comply with Fit North Carolina's statute
mandated the death penally for all persons convicted of first degree
murder regardless of any mitigating circumstances."
In this case, the defendants were among four men involved in an
armed robbery which resulted in the death of a cashier and serious
injury of a customer.s° Two of the men involved were allowed to plead
guilty to lesser offenses, but the defendants were found guilty of first
76 Id. at 244.
71 Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 246.
72 Id.
78 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 246-47.
76 Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 253 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. am 188 (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at
313 (Whited., concurring))).
77 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
76 See id. at 282.
7" See id. at 286-87.
8° Id. at 282-83.
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degree murder and immediately sentenced to death as required by
the North Carolina statute. 81
Because the Furman decision had determined that unfettered
discretion on the part of the jury was unconstitutional, North Caro-
lina attempted to remove all discretion. 82 The Supreme Court disap-
proved of this solution, however, and declared the North Carolina
scheme unconstitutional." This statute, the Court felt, did not "fulfill
Furman's basic requirement by replacing arbitrary and wanton jury
discretion with objective standards to guide, regularize, and make ra-
tionally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death." 84
The Court held that the Eighth Amendment against cruel and un-
usual punishment required consideration of the individual offender
and the circumstances of the offense:
While the prevailing practice of individualizing sentencing
determinations generally reflects simply enlightened policy
rather than a constitutional imperative, we believe that in
capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underly-
ing the Eighth Amendment ... requires consideration of the
character and record of the individual offender and the cir-
cumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally in-
dispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of
death. 85
In coming to this conclusion, the Court echoed the Furman decision,
finding that death was qualitatively different from any prison sentence
no matter how long." Because of this difference, the Court empha-
sized a "corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the de-
termination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific
case. 
”87
4. jurek v. Texas
Finally, on the same day in 1976, in Jun* v. Texas, the Supreme
Court upheld an altogether different type of death penalty statute. 88
81 Id. at 283-84.
82 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 302.
85 See id. at 305.
84 Id. at 303.
85 Id. at 304.
86 See id. at 303-04; see also Farman, 408 U.S. at 286-89 (Brennan, J., concurring).
87 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305.
88 See 428 U.S. 262,276-77 (1976).
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Texas responded to Furman by creating a statute listing several catego-
ries of crimes considered death penalty eligible, or capital crimes, 89
After finding a defendant guilty of a capital crime, the jury was given
three special issue questions to answer at the sentencing phase." The
second special issue question called for a prediction of the defen-
dant's future dangerousness by asking the jury to determine if the de-
fendant was likely to commit future acts of violence that would consti-
tute a continuing threat to society. 91
 The other two special issue
questions were: whether the conduct, of the defendant that caused the
death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the rea-
sonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another would
result; and, if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the de-
fendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the
provocation., if any, by the deceased.92
If the jury found that the state had proved each issue beyond a
reasonable doubt and unanimously answered "yes" to all three special
questions, the defendant automatically received the death penalty
rather than life in prison. 93
In Jurck, the defendant, was convicted of murder committed in
the course of attempted kidnapping and forcible rape. 94 During the
sentencing phase of the trial, the jury heard several witnesses testify to
the defendant's bad reputation in the community; evidence that the
defendant had always been steadily employed and contributed to his
family's support was also presented at this time by the defendant's fa-
ther.95
 The jury answered "yes" to all of the relevant special issue ques-
89
 For instance, a crime may be considered death penalty eligible if: the victim holds
special status such as a police officer or a young child; the murder is committed during the
commission of another felony; the murderer was incarcerated and murdered someone
employed in the penal institution; the murder was committed for remuneration, or if the
murderer employed another to commit the murder for remuneration or the promise of
remuneration. SecThx.1 . 1,,NAL Coot, ANN. § 19.03 (Vernon 2001).
9)lif Mt 428 U.S, at 269,
91 Id.
72 Id. Since the Jure* decision the Texas statute has been modified to include the fol-
lowing special issue question in addition to those previously mentioned: Whether, taking
into consideration all of the evidence, including the circumstances of the offense, the de-
fendant's character and background, and the personal moral culpability of the defendant,
there is sufficient mitigating circumstance or circumstances to warrant that a sentence of
life imprisonment rather than a death sentence be imposed. TEx. CR1M. PROC. CODE ANN.
Art. 37.071 § 2 (e) (1) (Vernon 2001).
es Junk, 428 U.S. at 269.
91 Id. at 264-65, 267.
as M. at 267.
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dons and the judge then sentenced the defendant to death in accor-
dance with the statute. 98
Although Texas did not specifically outline statutory mitigating
and aggravating factors for the jury to consider at sentencing, the
Court found that the second special issue question pertaining to the
future dangerousness of the defendant allowed the defense to bring
to the jury's attention any relevant mitigating circtunstances. 97 Thus,
the Court found that this solution suitably guided and focused the
jury's consideration of the particularized circumstances of the offense
and the offender before imposing a sentence of death.98 Since the
Texas system "assure [d] that sentence of death [would] not be 'wan-
tonly' or 'freakishly' imposed, it [did] not violate the Constitution."99
11. BAREFOOT V. ESTELLE AND DAUBERT V. MERRILL DOW
PHARMACEUTICALS: WHEN IS EXPERT TESTIMONY ADMISSIBLE IN
CAPITAL SENTENCING HEARINGS?
By the time of the 1983 decision of Barefoot v. Estelle, ] 	the Su-
preme Court had established several tenets of its Eighth Amendment.
doctrine. 191 The Court had determined, for example, that juries shall
be guided in their determinations of death sentences in order to pro-
vide more consistent results; despite the need for consistent results,
however, juries must also make individualized determinations regard-
ing each crime and each defendant. 192 The Court had also concluded
that death is different from any other punishment, so different stan-
dards of evidence apply; because of this difference, the information
presented to the jury at sentencing must be particularly accurate so
that the jury may make a reliable determination that death is the ap-
propriate punishment. ] "
This last requirement of accuracy and reliability, as articulated in
Gregg v. Georgia and Woodson v. North Carolina, was a source of dis-
agreement among the members of the Court in Barefoot v. Estelle. 10"
95 Id. at 267-68.
97 Sec id. at 272.
Jumk, 428 U.S. at 274.
" Id. at 276,
100 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
101 See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
102 See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
103 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
1" See Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 901 (stating the position of the majority); id. at 924-25
(8iacktium, J., dissenting).
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The language in these opinions, as well as the ultimate holdings of
the cases, has created some confusion regarding the Court's Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence.'" What did the Court mean in Gregg
when it required "accurate sentencing information [as] an indispen-
sable prerequisite to a reasoned determination" of whether or not to
impose a death sentence?'" What did the Court mean in Woodson
when it articulated the "need for reliability in the determination that
death is the appropriate punishment?" 107
The Court's 1993 decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals may be a clue to what the Court meant by "reliability" in death
penalty sentencing information—though that opinion surfaced in a
wholly separate context: that of federal civil law. 108
A. The Barefoot Standard for Admissibility of Psychiatric Experts'
Predictions of Fu titre Dangerousness in Sentencing Phases of
Capital Trials: No Reliability Required
In 1983, in Barefoot v. Estelle, the Supreme Court held that the
United States District Court for the Western District of Texas did not
err in admitting psychiatric testimony to predict the future
dangerousness of the defendant)" The defendant in Barefoot was
convicted of the capital murder of a police officer.'" During the sen-
tencing phase of the trial, the State called two psychiatrists to testify to
the probability that the defendant would commit further violent acts
and present a future danger to society. 111
 The jury answered all of the
relevant special issue questions in the affirmative, including the ques-
tion of whether there was a probability that the defendant would
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing
threat to society." 2
 Subsequently, the defendant was sentenced to
death as required by the Texas statute. 113
Dr. John Holbrook testified that "it was 'within [his] capacity as a
doctor of psychiatry to predict 1.11e future dangerousness of an individual
105 See, e.g., Clarke, supra note 5, at 418-19.
1 °6 428 U.S. 153, 190 (1976).
1°7428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
108 Sec 509 U.S. 579, 589, 593-94 (1993).
mg Sec 463 U.S. at 905-06.
Ho Id. at 883.
111 Sec id. at 884.
112 Sec id.
113
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within a reasonable medical certainty." 114 Dr. James Grigson testified that
he had examined "between thirty and forty thousand individuals,"
and that if given enough information, he could give an opinion
"within reasonable psychiatric certainty as to [the] psychological or psy-
chiatric makeup of an individital." 118 He further explained that "this
skill was 'particular to the field of psychiatr[y] and not the average
layman." 116
Neither doctor actually interviewed the defendant; rather, they
based their analyses on a lengthy hypothetical question asking them
to assume the following: that the defendant had committed four pre-
vious non-violent. offenses; had a bad reputation for obeying the law
in some communities; had escaped from a New Mexico jail (evidence
of these things was also presented during the sentencing hearing);
and had committed the capital murder of a police officer." 7
On the basis of the hypothetical question, Dr. Holbrook diag-
nosed the defendant as a "'criminal sociopath'" and stated that no
treatment could change the defendant's condition. 118 In fact, Dr.
Holbrook felt, though the condition would not change for the better,
it "'may become accelerated." 119 Dr. Holbrook's conclusion was that
"'within reasonable psychiatric certainty' ... the [defendant would]
commit criminal acts of violence in the future that would constitute a
continuing threat to society." 120
Similarly, Dr. Grigson diagnosed the defendant as a sociopath in
the "'most severe category" for which there was no known cure.'" Dr.
Grigson concluded that "whether [the defendant] was in society at
large, or in a prison society there was a 'one hundred percent and abso-
lute' chance that [the defendant] would commit future acts of crimi-
nal violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society." 122
In response to the defense's claims that psychiatric predictions of
future dangerousness were completely unreliable, condemned by the
APA, and unconstitutional, the majority opinion, written by Justice
White, stated: "[n]either petitioner nor the [APA] suggests that psy-
chiatrists are always wrong with respect to future dangerousness, only
114 Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 918 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
112 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
116 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
117 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
118 Id. at 918-19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
118 Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 918-19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
128 Id. at 919 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
121 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
122 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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most of the time."123
 The majority concluded that though psychiatric
predictions of future dangerousness may be "generally so unreliable
that it. should be ignored," this argument could be made on cross-
examination) 24 The Court. felt that the jury could be trusted to sort
out: the reliable from the unreliable through the adversary process) 25
The APA filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the defen-
dant's contention that psychiatrists individually and as a class are not
competent to predict future dangerousness and that their predictions
are so likely to encourage erroneous sentences that their use violates
the Eighth Amendment) 2° The brief stated that the APA's best esti-
mate was that psychiatrists' predictions of future dangerousness in an
individual are wrong "two out of three" times) 27
Justice Blackmun's dissent. also noted that John Monahan, con-
sidered the "'leading thinker on the issue" even by the State's expert,
concluded that even the best clinical research indicates that psychiat-
ric predictions of future dangerousness are accurate in no more than
one out of every three tries, 128
 This dissent further noted that
"Inleither the Court nor the State of Texas has cited a single reputa-
ble scientific source contradicting the unanimous conclusion of pro-
fessionals in this field that psychiatric predictions of long-term future
violence are wrong more often than they are right." 129
Justice Blackmun's dissent also argued that it is impossible to jus-
tify allowing psychiatric predictions of dangerousness to be consid-
ered by a jury when the Constitution's paramount concern in death
penalty cases is reliability)" In Texas, the statute requires that the jury
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant will commit future
acts of criminal violence."' Justice Blackmun argued that if psychia-
trists with their aura of professional expertise are permitted to testify
to this issue in terms of medical certainty then there is a severe clan-
ger that this testimony will lead to erroneously-imposed sentences)"
The dissent restated the importance of reliability, recognized in Wood-
son, in determining whether death is the appropriate punishment in a
123 Id. at 901.
124 Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 898.
125
 Id, at 899.
126 Id. at 920 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
127 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
128 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
129 Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 921 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
is° Id, at 923 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
131 Id. at 924 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
In Id. at 924, 926 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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specific case: "The Court does not see fit to mention this principle
today, yet it is as firmly established as any in our Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence."'" Though this evidence may be relevant, Justice
Blackmun suggested that its unreliability detracts from its probative
value. 14 He argued that this expert testimony is unduly prejudicial to
the defendant. because unreliable scientific evidence may mislead a
jury. 135
Justice Blackmun also attacked the majority's conclusion that the
adversary process can adequately sort reliable from unreliable opin-
ions about future dangerousness)" Blackmun wondered how juries
can be expected to separate valid from invalid opinions when psychia-
trists themselves are unable to do so.'" Blackmun further suggested
that there is no doubt that such testimony will have a great effect on
juries because judges themselves rely heavily on expert opinions re-
garding dangerousness.'" He noted that the American Bar Associa-
tion has warned expressly that sentencing juries are particularly inca-
pable of dealing with information relating to future dangerousness
and similar predictive judgments. 139 "Ultimately," Justice Blackmun
wrote, "when the Court knows full well that psychiatrists' predictions
of dangerousness are specious, there can be no excuse for imposing
on the defendant, on pain of his life, the heavy burden of convincing
a jury of laymen of the frattd."14°
B. The Daubert Standard for Admissibility of Expert Testimony in Federal
Civil Cases: Relevance and Reliability Are Required
In 1993, the Supreme Court decided Daubert v. Merle Dow Phar-
maceuticals, a more recent opinion dealing with reliability in expert
155 Id. at 924 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
134 See Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 926-28 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
135 See id. at 926-28 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE)
do not apply to the sentencing phase of state capital trials. See, e.g., Flores v. Johnson, 210
F.3d 456, 464 n.10 (5th Cir. 2000) (Garza, J., concurring). The text of FRE 403, however,
helps to illustrate Justice Blackmun's statement: "Although relevant, evidence may be ex-
cluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay. waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Fr.n. It EVID. 403.
156 Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 929-30 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
137 Id. at 929 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
158 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
139 Id. at 930 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
140 Id. at 935-36 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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testimony. 141 In Barefoot, the majority determined that the apparent
unreliability of expert determinations of future dangerousness was
not an issue affecting admissibility of the testimony, but rather an is-
sue for the jury to consider. 142
 Justice Blackmun, in his dissent in Bare-
foot, assailed the majority for ignoring the need for reliability of evi-
dence in capital cases which the Court had emphasized in Woodson v.
North Carolina. 145
In Danbert, a federal civil case, the plaintiffs presented several ex-
perts who testified that. the drug Bendectin caused birth defects)"
The experts' testimony was based on animal studies which indicated a
link between the drug and malformations. 145
 The Court. in Daubed
abandoned the Frye test, 146
 also known as the "general acceptance" 147
test for admissibility of expert evidence which required only that "the
thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently estab-
lished to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs." 148
The Court ruled that the Frye test had been superceded by the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence." 9
 Justice Blackmun, now
the author of the majority opinion, interpreted Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 702 to include a duty on the part of judges in federal trials to
"ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is
not only relevant, but. refiable." 15°
The Court went on to list several non-exclusive factors to assist.
judges in determining the reliability of scientific evidence: whether
the evidence can and has been tested; whether the theory or tech-
nique has been subjected to peer review; whether the technique or
theory has a known or potential rate of error; whether there are stan-
dards controlling the operation or technique; and whether the theory
or technique has achieved a degree of acceptance within the commu-
nity of practitioners within the particular field. 151
 If a federal judge
See 509 U.S. at 590; sec also Michael H. Gottesman, From Barefoot to Danbert to
Joiner: Triple Play or Double Error?40 Attu.. L. REV. 753,756 (1998),
"2 See 463 U.S. at 900-01.
14 See id. at 924-29.
"4 509 U.S. at 582-83.
L4
	-u583.
"6 Id. at 597.
" 7 Id. at 585.
118 Id. at 586.
"9 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588-89.
150 Id. at 589 (emphasis added).
I " Sec id. at 593-94.
226	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 44:207
determines that the proffered expert testimony does not meet any of
these factors, or that the testimony is otherwise irrelevant or unreli-
able, then the judge has the ability as gatekeeper to exclude it. 152 No
one factor is dispositive. 153 The Court did "not presume to set out a
definitive checklist or test."'"
Justice Blackmun went on to echo the language of his dissent in
Barefoot, this time stating the principle as the position of the majority
of the Court:
Rule 403 permits the exclusion of relevant evidence "if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice ... or misleading the jury...." Judge Wein-
stein has explained: "Expert evidence can be both powerful
and quite misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating
it. Because of this risk, the judge in weighing possible preju-
dice against probative force tinder Rule 403 ... exercises
more control over experts than over lay witnesses." 155
C. Would Barefoot Be Overruled 'Today?
Daubert, it must be noted, does not apply in the context of sen-
tencing hearings or state criminal cases because it is a case interpret-
ing federal, rather than state, issues.I 56 The Court's shift in thinking
regarding the reliability of expert testimony seems significant, how-
ever.t 57 As one Fifth Circuit Judge notes:
It is well settled that, in the federal courts, the rules of evi-
dence generally do not apply at a sentencing hearing, even
one in which the death penalty is a possibility.... However,
the cardinal concern of the rules of admissibility for expert
testimony—reliability—is also the paramount concern in
addressing the constitutionality of capital sentencing proce-
dures. This cannot be mere coincidence. 158
152 See id. at 592-95.
' 63 See id. at 593.
154 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
"5 Id. at 595; see also Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 926-28.
156 Sec G. Michael Fenner, The Daubert Handbook: The Case, Its Essential Dilemma, and Its
Progeny, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 939,974 (1996).
1 " See Flores, 210 F.3d at 464-65 (Garza, J., concurring).
"a See id. at 464 n.10 (Garza, J., concurring).
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Daubed may suggest an appropriate level of reliability and accu-
racy required in the specific context of death penalty sentencing hear-
ings to ensure that the defendant's Eighth Amendment. rights are not
xiolated, 159 To date, the Court has not yet addressed whether expert.
predictions of future danger are admissible in the post-Daubert era. 16°
At least one case, Nen no v. State, decided in 1998 by the Court. of
Criminal Appeals of Texas, suggests t.hat Daubed has changed little at
the state leve1. 10 In this case, the defendant was convicted of raping
and murdering a chikl.i 62 At sentencing, the state presented Kenneth
Uniting, a Supervisory Special Agent in the Behavioral Science unit
of the FBI, who specialized in studying the sexual victimization of
children. 163 Mr. Lanning clid not interview the defendant, but based
on a hypothetical question about the defendant and the crime, he
stated that the defendant would be "difficult to rehabilitate" and that
he "'would be an extreme threat to society and especially' children
within his age preference. '"164
The defendant claimed that the admission of the testimony of
Mr. Lanning was error because it failed the factors outlined in Dauber!
for the admissibility of expert testimony. 165 The court disagreed with
this claim, however, stating "Nile general principles announced in
Kelly (and Dauber!) apply, but the specific factors outlined in those
cases may or may not apply depending upon the comext." 166
The court went on to conclude that the Daubed factors applied to
the social sciences "wit.h less rigor than to the hard sciences." 167 The
159 See id.
ISO See John Monahan, Violence Risk Assessment: Scientific Validity and Evidentiary Admissi-
bility, 57 WAsn. R LEL L. REv. 901, 916 (2000).
H" Sec 970 S.W.2d 549, 552, 560, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998), overruled on other grounds
by State v. Terrazas, 4 S.W.3d 720 (Tex. Grim. App. 1999).
165 Id. at 552.
1cs Id
164 1d.
163 See id. at 560. Defendant specifically urged that Lanning's testimony was lacking be-
cause the State failed to produce any evidence (1) that the theories underlying Lanning's
testimony are accepted as valid by the relevant scientific community; (2) that the alleged
literature on the theories supports his theories, (3) that there are specific data or pub-
lished articles regarding the area of future dangerousness of prison inmates, (4) that his
theories have been empirically tested, (5) that he has conducted any studies or independ-
ent research in the area of future dangerousness, or (6) that anyone else had tested or
evaluated the theories upon which his testimony was based." Id,
1613 Nenno, 970 S.W.24 at 560; see also Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568, 573 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1992) (requiring satisfaction of reliability test for expert testimony similar to test
announced in Daubed).
Iv Nen no, 970 S.W.2d at 561.
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more appropriate questions when referring to predictions of future
danger are: "(1) whether the field of expertise is a legitimate one, (2)
whether the subject matter of the expert's testimony is within the
scope of that field, and (3) whether the expert's testimony properly
relies upon and/or utilizes the principles involved in the field." 168
The court determined that Lanning's testimony satisfied this less
rigorous test for admissibility of social science evidence; the opinion,
however, made no reference to the Supreme Court's finding that the
Eighth Amendment required heightened accuracy and reliability
within the context of death penalty sentencing. 169
III. FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS AS AN AGGRAVATING FACTOR IN
CAPITAL CASES
The Supreme Court's decision in Barefoot v. Estelle remains con-
troversial considering the Court's prior disdain for arbitrariness and
caprice as well as its emphasis on accuracy and reliability.'" Some
states, including Mississippi and California, do not include future
dangerousness among their list of statutory aggravating factors and
have determined that the admission of evidence with regard to future
dangerousness at the sentencing phase of capital trials was reversible
error."'
Twenty-one states, however, include a defendant's possible future
dangerousness among the aggravating circumstances to be considered
at the sentencing phase; Texas and Oregon actually require the jury
to predict future danger in their decision whether to grant life or
death."2
In states allowing the determination of a defendant's future
dangerousness, the use of expert psychiatric testimony is the pre-
ferred method of proving the issue.'" In fact, requiring the prosecu-
tion to prove future danger may implicitly invite the use of expert tes-
169 Id.
169 See id. at 561-62.
179 See, e.g., Giaunelli, supra note 18, at 113-14; kirchmeier, supra note 3, at 370-71;
Edmund H. Mantel], A Modest Proposal to Dress the Emperor: Psychiatric and Psychological Opin-
ion in the Courts, 4 WIDENER]. Puts. L. 53, 62-63 (1994).
171 See, e.g., People v. Murtishaw, 631 P.2d 446, 471 (Cal. 1981); Balfour v. State, 598
So.2d 731, 748 (Miss. 1992).
172 See Sorensen, supra note 4, at 1252.
177 Sec Albertson, supra note 6, at 19.
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timony because that is the most expedient and effective way to prove
the isstte. 174
To further complicate the fact that psychiatric predictions of fu-
ture dangerousness are unreliable, many of these predictions are
based on long, complicated hypothetical questions rather than on
actual interviews with defendants; even when there are actual psychi-
atric interviews, they are often only minutes long. 179
A. Pervasive Use of Psychiatric Predictions of Future Dangerousness and fury
Reliance on Such. Testimony
In states that allow capital sentencing juries to consider the fu-
ture dangerousness of the defendant, expert testimony is relied upon
extensively."° Some stales, specifically, Texas and Oregon, go so far as
to require the jury to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant poses a continuing threat to society before imposing a
death sett tence. I"
It. is no surprise then that prosecutors in such jurisdictions tend
to rely primarily on the simplest and most expedient method of con-
vincing juries of the defendant's future dangerousness." 9 Defendants
who have been given a death sentence under this form of sentencing
often appeal on the ground that such determinations are unreliable
and inaccurate. 179
 Unfortunately for these defendants, courts, includ-
ing the United States Supreme Court, have consistently upheld the
use of psychiatric predictions of dangerousness apparently reasoning
that such testimony is admissible even though it may have no scientific
merit. 180
Despite attempts to restrict psychiatric predictions of
dangerousness, such testimony remains the preferred means of per-
174 Sec Mehler, supra note 6, at 110; Texas Defender Service, supra note 8, at 26.
176 See. e.g.. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (noting doctor's prediction based
on 90 minute interview with defendant); see also Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 918
(1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (explaining psychiatrists' testimony was not based on
actual examination—because neither examined defendant—but rather on extended hypo-
thetical questions); Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 458 (5th Cir. 2000) (Garza, J., concur-
ring) (noting doctor never examined defendant, nor did he make his evaluation based on
psychological records or psychological testing).
176 Sec Albertson, supra note 6, at 19; Clarke, supra note 5, at 445-46; Texas Defender
Service, supra note 8, at 26.
177 Sec Thx. GRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. Art. 37.071 § 2(c) (Vernon 2001); OR REV. STAT.
§ 163.150(1)(d) (2001).
178
 Sec Yielder, supra note 6, at 110; Texas Defender Service, supra note 8, at 26.
179
 Albertson, supra note 6, at 19-20.
180 Id. at 20.
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suading a jury of a defendant's continuing threat to society and the
need for the death penalty. 181
1. Theories Explaining Prosecutorial Exploitation and Jury Accep-
tance of Expert Predictions of Dangerousness
One reason for such extensive prosecutorial reliance on psychiat-
ric predictions of future dangerousness may be that such expert tes-
timony achieves a high success rate among jurors. 182 There are several
theories that explain why psychiatric predictions of future
dangerousness hold great weight with juries. 183
One reason for the success of expert testimony is that juries tend
to lend greater weight to the testimony of a witness who offers a
statement of professional opinion than they would to that of a lay wit-
ness."4 The American Psychiatric Association explains the phenome-
non: "A psychiatrist comes into the courtroom wearing a mantle of
expertise that inevitably enhances the credibility, and therefore the
impact, of the testimony." 185
Judge Garza of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals also sheds light
on juries' great deference to expert opinion:
As some courts have indicated, the problem here (as with all
expert testimony) is not the introduction of one man's opin-
ion on another's future dangerousness, but the fact that the
opinion is introduced by one whose title and education (not
to mention designation as "expert") gives him significant
181 See id. at 19-20.
18'
	
e.g.. Flores, 210 F.3c1 at 466 (Garza, J., concurring) ("As has been previously rec-
ognized, when a medical doctor testifies that 'future dangerousness' is a scientific inquiry
on which they have particular expertise, and testifies that a particular defendant would be
a 'continuing threat to society,' juries are almost always persuaded."); Bennett v. State, 766
S.W.2d 227, 232 (Tex. Grim. App. 1989) (Teague, J., dissenting) ("Millen Dr. Grigson
testifies at the punishment stage of a capital murder trial he appears to the average lay
juror ... to be the second coming of the Almighty.... Dr. Grigson is extremely good at
persuading jurors to vote to answer the [future dangerousness] issue in the affirmative.");
see also Brief of Amici Curiae for the American Psychiatric Association at 6, Barefoot v.
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (No. 82-6080) [hereinafter APA Brief] (stating that psychiat-
ric opinions regarding future dangerousness are prejudicial to defendant).
183 See Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 924, 926-27, 934; White v. Estelle, 554 F. Stipp. 851, 858
(S.D. Tex. 1982); Mantel], supra note 175, at 65; APA's Brief at 3-6, Barrfoot (No. 82-6080).
154 See APA's Brief at 6, Barefoot (No. 82-6080); see also White, 554 F. Supp. at 858
("[W] hen this lay opinion is proffered by a witness bearing the title of 'Doctor,' its impact
on the jury is much greater than if it were not masquerading as something it is not.").
155 APA's Brief at 6, Barefoot (No. 82-6080).
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credibility in the eyes of the jury as one whose opinion
comes with the imprimatur of scientific fact. 186
The APA is particularly disturbed by the influence that an "ex-
pert" may hold over a jury considering that the Association does not
believe that there_are any special interpretive skills which psychiatrists
bring to this issue. 187
 The APA asserts that dressing up the actuarial
data with such "expert" opinion impermissibly distorts the fact-finding
process due to the undue weight the jury is likely to place on the tes-
timony. 188
Another possible explanation for the success of psychiatric pre-
dictions of future dangerousness with juries is that jurors are more
likely to rely on the psychiatrist who is one hundred percent certain of
his opinion than the psychiatrist who simply states that such predic-
tions are unreliable. 189
 Psychiatrists who are willing to state that they
can predict the defendant will definitely be violent in the future pres-
ent the inexperienced juror with an apparent "medical" conclusion
that is highly prejudicial as well as difficult to rebut. 19" The prejudice
cannot. easily be dealt with through cross-examination or rebuttal ex-
perts; most psychiatrists do not, believe that they are capable of mak-
ing long-term predictions of future dangerousness so they are unable
to counterbalance the testimony of the prosecution experts because
they appear less certain. 191
 Justice Blackmun described the likely re-
sult of this unbalanced battle of experts:
Given a choice between an expert who says that he can pre-
dict with certainty that the defendant, whether confined in
prison or free in society, will kill again, and an expert who
says merely that no such prediction can be made, members
of the jury charged by law with making the prediction surely
will be tempted to opt for the expert who claims he can help
them in performing their duty, and who predicts dire conse-
quences if the defendant is not put to death. 192
188
 Flows, 210 F.3d at 465-66 (Garza J., concurring).
189 See APA's Brief at 3, Barefoot (No. 82-6080).
188 Id.
189 Sec id. at 6; Mantel!, supra note 175, at 65-66.
199 Sec APA's Brief at 6, Barefoot (No, 82-6080); Man tell, supra note 175, at 65-66.
191
 APA's Brief at 6, Barefoot (No. 82-6080).
199
 Mantel], supra note 175,65-66 (quoting Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 934 (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting)).
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Thus, the jury hears one expert testify that he is certain that the
defendant will be dangerous and another expert disputing not that
the defendant will be dangerous, but that the state's expert may not
be qualified or able to make such a determination."'
2. Empirical Evidence of the Jury Decision-Making Process
The success of expert testimony with juries is demonstrated by a
1992 National Law journal/Lexis poll that interviewed close to 800
jurors in both civil and criminal cases about their opinions on the jury
system.'" In the criminal context, 95% of the 53% of jurors who
heard expert testimony found that testimony believable. 195 Among the
jurors in criminal cases who heard psychiatric expert testimony, 87%
found it believable. 196
It may be, however, that these numbers mainly speak for the ex-
perts on the prosecution side of criminal trials. 197 In the mid-1990s,
the National Science Foundation undertook a study of the decision-
making process of capital juries nationwide. 198 In the California seg-
ment of the project, 152 capital jurors who had participated in thirty-
six cases were extensively interviewed; of these cases, eighteen re-
sulted in a verdict of death, seventeen resulted in life without parole,
and one jury was hung over the penalty."
When questioned about the credibility of defense experts, typi-
cally psychiatrists or psychologists who explain to the jury why the de-
fendant may have behaved as he clid, 2" the jurors' impressions were
"more than twice as likely to be negative rather than positive." 201 Ju-
rors negatively cited twenty-seven different defense experts in eight-
een cases. 202 In contrast, jurors negatively cited only three experts
among the prosecution's witnesses in all thirty-six cases. 2°3 "The pro-
193 See APA's Brief at 3, Barefoot (No. 82-6080).
194 Joan M. Cheever & Joanne Nahuatl, The View from the Jury Box: Poll: futon Have Faith
in System, NAT'L 1.J., Feb. 22, 1993, at S2.
1 D 5 View from the fin), Box: Expert Witnesses Found Credible by Most Jurors, NAT'L	 Feb.
22, 1993, at S4.
196 Id.
197 See Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital furies Perceive
Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. Rev. 1109, 1123 (1997).
198 See id. at 1112-13; sec also Flrilliam J. Bowers, The CapitalJusy Project: Rationale, Design.
and Preview of Early Findings, 10 INn. 1.. J. 1043, 1043 (1995).
199 Sundby, supra note 202, at 1112-13.
299 See id. at 1118.
291 Id. at 1123.
202 Id.
203 See id. at 1125.
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fessional experts called by the prosecution, therefore, enjoyed a far
better positive to negative ratio than did the defense experts." 204
One reason for this disparity is that the jurors interviewed were
more likely to see the defense experts as hired guns willing to testify
for whoever was paying them. 205
 "[T] his skepticism of experts as hired
guns appearfedj to work most. harshly against the defendant as the
party most clearly 'paying' for the expert testiznony." 206
B. Predictions of Future Dangerousness are Unreliable
Despite the popularity of future dangerousness predictions, such
evidence has been subject to assaults by mental health professionals as
well as the American Bar Association. 2" The American Psychiatric As-
sociation has said that the ability of psychiatrists or any other profes-
sionals to reliably predict future violence is improven. 208
For example, two attorneys, Bruce J. Ennis, former legal director
of the American Civil Liberties Union, and Thomas R. Litwack, pro-
fessor at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, have challenged psychi-
atric predictions of future dangerousness as inaccurate. 209
 These
authors assert that flipping a coin would be a more accurate means of
making a future dangerousness determination. 20
In one study reviewed by Ennis and Litwack, 969 prisoner-pa-
tients, who had been detained in maximum security hospitals because
they had been diagnosed mentally ill and too dangerous for release or
transfer to civil hospitals, were released in conformity with the Su-
preme Court's decision in Baxstroot v. HeroM.2" One year after the in-
mates were transferred to civil hospitals, "147 had been discharged to
the community and the 702 who remained were found to present no
2° 4 SUIldby, supra note 202, at 1125.
2°5 See id. at 1129-30.
206 id.
207
 See, e.g., Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 930 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing American Bar
Association's warning that juries are particularly incapable of dealing with information
regarding defendant's future dangerousness); APA's Brief at 6, Barefoot (No. 82-6080).
2°8
 See APA's Brief at 6, Barefoot (No. 82-6080).
2°8
 See Albertson, supra note 6, at 20-21; see generally Bruce J. Ennis & Thomas R. Lit-
wack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L.
REV. 693 (1974).
21° See Ennis Litwack, supra note 214, at 737; see also Albertson, supra note 6, at 21.
2 " Ennis & Litwack, supra note 214, at 712; sec also Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107,
110,111 (1966) (holding that prisoners detained in Department of Corrections hospitals
after their sentence had expired must be released and committed civilly, if committed at
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special problems to hospital staff." 212 Only seven of the 969 were
found to be so dangerous that they required recommitment to a
prison hospital.2 n
In another study reviewed by Ennis and Litwack, a team of several
mental health professionals including at least two psychiatrists con-
ducted "unusually thorough clinical examinations" of individuals con-
victed of "serious assaultive crimes:114 Out of forty-nine patients pre-
dicted to be dangerous by the mental health teams, but who were
ultimately released after a court hearing, sixty-five percent were not
found to have committed a violent crime within five years of release to
the community. 2 " "In other words, two-thirds of those released de-
spite predictions of dangerousness by the professional team did not in
fact turn out to be dangerous."2"
More research on the ability of psychiatric professionals to pre-
dict dangerousness conducted in the 1980s and 1990s produces
slightly more positive results. 217 Researchers in the 1980s and 1990s
have:
(1) replaced proxy measures of risk with clinicians' specific
predictions or assessments, (2) expanded their definitions of
violence to include such legally relevant behaviors as verbal
threats, (3) expanded their criterion measures beyond
official arrest and hospital records to include violence de-
tected through self-report and the report of knowledgeable
third parties, and (4) begun to examine the role that situa-
tion-al/environmental factors may play in subsequent vio-
lence.218
Using this newer body of research and analysis, "more recent studies
suggest that one out of every two people predicted to be violent would
go on to engage in some kind of legally relevant, violent behavior."219
Additionally, Dr. Jonathan R. Sorensen has presented recent data
which indicates how often not only expert predictions of future
212 	LitIATICk, supra note 214, at 712.
219 Id.
214 Id. at 713.
215 a
216 Id.
217 See Randy K. Otto, On the Ability of Mental Health Professionals to "Predict
Dangerousness": A Commentary on Intopretations of the "Dangerousness" Literature, 18 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REV. 43,62-63 (1994).
218 Id. at 63.
219 Id.
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dangerousness are incorrect, but also how these such predictions fail
in genera1.220
 Sorensen describes a study of actual violence among
6,390 incarcerated individuals in Texas serving an average of 4.55
years during January 1990 through March 1999. 221
 After considering
the actual rates of several types of violent acts as well as the character-
istics of incarceration, Sorensen concluded:
[T] he estimated likelihood of violence being committed by a
newly received capital murderer over the next forty years . • .
is .164. The approximate risk of a given capital murderer
committing [the considered violent offenses] over the en tire
period of his incarceration is essentially double (1.95 times)
the observed estimates. For example, the probability a capi-
tal defendant will kill again while incarcerated over the next
forty years is 0.2%, or about two in one thousand. 222
"Most jurors are unaware," writes Sorensen, "that both correctional
administrators and inmates agree that murderers are generally among
the most docile and trustworthy inmates in the institution."223 In fact,
jurors in capital trials often believe the opposite is true. 224
 Interviews
conducted with jurors serving in capital cases resulting in the death
penalty estimated that there was an "85% likelihood that the defen-
dant would commit a violent crime and a 50% likelihood that the de-
fendant would commit a new homicide had they been given a sen-
tence of life imprisonment." 225
Furthermore, mental health professionals do not trust themselves
to make accurate predictions of future dangerousness. 22° In one study,
several hundred practicing physicians, clinical psychologists, and
mental health lawyers were asked to estimate the percentage of accu-
rate predictions made concerning future dangerousness. 227
 The mean
fell between forty to forty-six percent, or less than half.228 Though be-
havioral scientists tend to be skeptical of research data and specific
research findings, academics and professionals have quickly and al-
2" SCC Sorensen, supra note 4, at 1269-70.
221 See id. at 1260.
2" Id. at 1264.
2" Id. at 1256.
224
 See id. at 1269.
225
 Sorensen, supra note 4, at 1269.
226 Albertson, supra note 6, at 21.
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most unanimously accepted the conclusion that professionals are un-
reliable and inaccurate in predicting future violence. 229
Numerous theories further explain why psychiatric predictions of
future dangerousness are unreliable. 230 One explanation for the inac-
curacy of these predictions could be that dangerousness has been his-
torically viewed as coming from within a subject's personality, when
the factors which may contribute to dangerousness are actually fre-
quently found in interpersonal and situational contexts. 2'
Dangerousness may also depend on the use of drugs or alcohol. 232
Because external factors need to be examined, a "person-focused"
analysis may be inaccurate because humans do not live in complete
isolation."3 Much psychological research emphasizes external and
environmental influences on behavior, but the criminal justice system
continues to primarily rely on person-focused predictions. 234
Predictions may also often fail because mental health profession-
als may not have been trained to perform such assessments. 238 "Simply
because one is termed a 'mental health professional' does not mean
that he or she understands the cognitive and behavioral processes
that create dangerous behavior."236 However, because a witness may
have some psychiatric training, they are presented by the State as "ex-
pert witnesses" fit to offer predictions of the future. 237
C. States That Do Not Consider Future Dangerousness
Several states including California and Mississippi do not list fu-
ture dangerousness among their statutory aggravating factors guiding
juries in death penalty cases. 238 In 1981, the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia in People v. Murtishazo, determined that admitting a psychiatric
expert's prediction that the defendant would be dangerous in the fu-
ture was reversible error because the testimony was highly unreliable,
extraordinarily prejudicial, and of limited relevance because future
229 Id.
2" See, e.g., id. at 21.
231 Albertson, supra note 6, at 45.
232 Id.
233 Id.
2" See id.
23s
	
at 46.
23e
	 nip/ note 6, at 46.
2" See id.
239 See, e.g., Owls/ram 29 P.2(1 at 471; Balfour, 598 So.2d at 748.
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dangerousness was not a specifically enumerated aggravating factor to
be considered. 239
In that case, (he defendant was convicted of killing three college
students and injuring a fourth.24° Despite the fact. that. California re-
quired no finding of future dangerousness and did not list this among
the statutory' enumerated aggravating factors, the State called Dr.
Ronald Siegel, a psychopharmacologist, to testify that the defendant
would continue to be violent in the funtre. 241
In finding the admission of this evidence to be error, the court.
concluded that "evidence which is barely reliable enough to justify a
civil judgment or a limited commitment is not reliable enough to util-
ize in determining whether a man should be executed." 242
The court further noted the effects of such testimony on a jury:
Such testimony implants in the mind of each juror the mes-
sage that the death penalty, promptly carried into effect, is
the only way to protect society from the defendant—the only
way to forestall another instance in which [the] defendant
responds to frustration with deadly violence. "A trier of fact
offered (he opportunity to base a decision on the affirmative
assertion by an apparently well-qttalified professional that a
defendant's execution is essential to saving the lives of others
is likely to take that opportunity rather than face the difficult
task of evaluating the offender's ethical culpability." 243
Such evidence, the court concluded, was too prejudicial to set before
the jury when future dangerousness was "only marginally relevant to
the task at hand."244
Mississippi also does not list future dangerousness among the ag-
gravating factors to be considered at capital sentencing hearings. 245
 In
1992, in Balfour v. State, the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that
because aggravating circumstances are to be limited to the eight statu-
tory factors, the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to repeat-
edly emphasize the defendant's propensity for future violence. 24(1
239 Sec 29 Cal.3t1 at 767-68.
249 Id. at 740.
241 Sec id. at 767.
242 Id. at
 771 .
243
 Id, at 773.
244
	 Muitishazo, 29 EU at 469.
249 See Balfoun 598 So.2d at 748.
246 Id. at 747-48.
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IV. WHY PSYCHIATRIC PREDICTIONS OF FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS
VIOLATE THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT'S BAN ON CRUEL
AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT AS INTERPRETED BY
THE SUPREME COURT
States which continue to consider a defendant's future
dangerousness and allow the presentation of psychiatric predictions
of future dangerousness at the sentencing phases of capital trials con-
tinue to violate the Eighth Amendment as interpreted by the Su-
preme Court in Furman v. Georgia, Gregg v. Georgia, and Woodson v.
North Carolina. 247
The Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is difficult to nav-
igate—especially after the Barefoot v. Estelle decision. 248 In Furman, the
Court held that the death penalty as administered at the time—in an
arbitrary and capricious manner through the unguided discretion of
juries—was in violation of the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and
unusual punishment. 249 In Woodson, the Court echoed the language of
Justice Brennan's concurrence in Furman, expressing that the death
penalty was a punishment to be held apart from all others with a
heightened need for reliability in the determination that death is the
appropriate punishment in a capital case. 250
The Court must have meant that juries require some legitimate,
helpful guidance in their decision-making. 2" It would not be in good
faith to simply infer from the Court's language that a state can satisfy
the requirements of Furman by merely placing any aggravating or
mitigating factors in their death penalty statutes which might guide a
jury's decision-making, no matter how confusing or unreliable that.
"guidance" might be. 252
A better interpretation of the Furman decision would be that ju-
ries must be given meaningful guidance which would lead them to the
most accurate decision possible because death, in its finality, is differ-
ent from all other punishments. 253 The Court's follow-up cases sup-
port this point of view. 254 The Court in Gregg emphasized that "i1CCU-
247 See supra notes 41 -68, 80-90 and accompanying text.
248 Sec supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
249 See 408 U.S. 238,239 (1972) (per curiam); hi. at 253 (Douglas,j1., concurring).
259 See 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976); see also Furman, 408 U.S. at 286-88 (Brennan,., con-
curring).
25n
	
supra notes 41-56 and accompanying text.
252 See supra notes 41 -56 and accompanying text.
259 Sec supra notes 41-68,80-90 and accompanying text.
254 Sec supra notes 41-68,80-90 and accompanying text.
20021	 Predictions of Future Dangerousness in Capital Cases
	 239
rate sentencing information is an indispensable prerequisite to a rea-
soned determination of whether a defendant shall live or die."255 In
Woodson, the Court. also explained that because death is so different
from other punishments there is a "corresponding difference in the
need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate
punishment in a specific case."256
In forth v. Texas, however, the Court veered slightly from this em-
phasis on reliability anti accuracy in jury determinations and accepted
the Texas death penalty scheme which required a determination of
the defendant's future dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt. 257
In that case, the Court seemed to shift from its original determination
in Furman that the death penalty not be arbitrarily or capriciously as-
signed to the more liberal conclusion that any death penalty statute
would be upheld as long as death was not "'wantonly" or "'freak-
ishly'" imposed. 258
The Court's decision in Barefoot clearly veered from the path of
Furman, Gregg, and Woodson. 259 In Barefoot, the Court decided that pat-
ently unreliable evidence presented in a highly prejudicial manner by
an expert was not unconstitutional because the adversarial process
could sort the problems out and the jury was well able to separate re-
liable from unreliable evidence. 20
 The APA and Justice Blackmun
disagreed, however, finding instead that juries are not capable of deal-
ing appropriately with psychiatric predictions of future
clangerousness. 261
forth opened the door for psychiatric predictions of future
dangerousness to be presented to juries at sentencing phases of capi-
tal trials and Barefoot cemented the admissibility of this patently unre-
liable evidence in death penalty determinations. 262
 Because these de-
cisions appear to contradict the previously established requirements
of reliability, accuracy, and the absence of arbitrariness and caprice in
death penalty determinations, the Supreme Court's Eight Amend-
255
 428 U.S. 153, 190 (1976),
56
 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305.
257
 Sec supra notes 91-103 and accompanying text.
258
 Sedurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976) (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stew-
art, J., concurring)); see also supra notes 91-103 and accompanying text;
259
 See supra notes 41-68, 80-90, 114-145 and accompanying text.
266 See SU pra notes 128-130 and accompanying text.
261 Sec supra notes 128-130; see also supra notes 131-145 and accompanying text.
262 See supra notes 91-103. 114-130 and accompanying text.
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ment jurisprudence has hung in a curious and confusing limbo ever
since they came down. 263
In 1993, the Supreme Court decided Dauber! v. Merrell Dow Mar-
maceuticals, Inc. 264 This case articulated a new test for the admissibility
of expert testimony in federal civil cases and voiced a concern in the
Court for reliability in expert testimony. 265 What this means in the
criminal setting at the sentencing phase of a state capital trial remains
unclear.266
.	 Despite the fact that the Dauber! discussion of reliability in expert
testimony was in the context of a federal civil case, its standard of reli-
ability should be a model for death penalty determinations. 267 The
Court has determined that because a death sentence is extremely se-
vere and final, there is a heightened need for reliability in the evi-
dence to be presented at capital sentencing hearings. 268 If the Court.
now requires that expert testimony in civil cases survive a particular
determination of reliability to assess admissibility, it only follows that
in the far more serious context of death penalty determinations, psy-
chiatric expert testimony should have to meet the Court's Dauber!
standard.269 This seems especially necessary considering the Court's
requirement that evidence admitted in death penalty sentencing
hearings be particularly reliable. 270
It is clear, however, that expert predictions of future
dangerousness fail each of the Dauber! factors which test the reliability
of such testiniony. 271 Expert testimony with regard to future
dangerousness can and has been tested; it has been revealed as unre-
liable for years. 272 Such predictions have been subject to peer review
and the reviews are virtually all negative. 273 The APA has condemned
psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness as inaccurate and un-
reliable.274 Future dangerousness predictions have been estimated to
have a failure rate of anywhere from two out of three to one out of
263 See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
264 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
263 See supra notes 154-159 and accompanying text.
266 See supra notes 161-174 and accompanying text.
267 See supra notes 161-174 and accompanying text.
268 See, e.g., Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305.
269 See supra notes 146-160.
270 See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305.
271 Sec supra notes 156,213-242 and accompanying text.
272 See supra notes 213-242 and accompanying text.
273 See supra notes 213-242 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 213-242 and accompanying text.
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two predictions. 278
 This rate of error suggests that there are not
sufficient. standards controlling the methods of prediction. 27° Finally,
among psychiatric professionals, there is not a degree of acceptance
of the ability of psychiatric experts to predict. future dangerousness. 277
Although the failure of one or two Daubert factors is not dispositive,
the Court's reasoning suggests that the failure of every single factor
would lead to a finding of unreliability and, therefore, inadmissibil-
11..278
Despite the findings of Daubert, however, the Federal Rules of
Evidence and stale equivalents do not apply at the sentencing phases
of capital trials. 279
 What Daubert does offer is an indication of what the
Court means by reliability. 28° If reliability for the Court means passing
sonic of the Daubert factors, then expert predictions of future
dangerousness are not reliable. 281
Because of this unreliability, psychiatric predictions of future dan-
gerousness have great. potential to mislead juries and result in the ar-
bitrary and capricious administration of the death penalty in violation
of the Eighth Amendment. 282
 When psychiatric experts take the stand
and declare with certainty that the defendant will be violent in the
future, the jury is inclined to agree. 288
The jury is generally presented with horrendous facts of which
they have already found the defendant guilty; then they are told by
someone labeled as a psychiatric "expert" that the defendant will
definitely harm others in the future. 28' The only testimony that the
defense expert can offer is that the prosecution's expert may not be
able to accurately predict future dangerousness. 285 Medical profes-
sionals who do not think they can predict the future of the defendant.
have difficulty rebutting the prosecution's expert because they cannot
declare to a one hundred percent certainty that the defendant will not
be violent. 28° Therefore, a jury confronted with this difficult decision
275 See supra notes 213-242 and accompanying text.
276 See supra notes 213-242 and accompanying text.
277 See supra notes 213-242 and accompanying text.
278 See supra notes 155-160 and accompanying text.
278
 Sec supra notes 155-160 and accompanying text.
286 Sec supra notes 155-160 and accompanying text.
281
 See supra notes 155-160 and accompanying text: see also supra notes 213-242 and ac-
companying text.
282
 Sec supra notes 182-242 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 182-211 aid accompanying text.
284 See supra notes 187-193 and accompanying text.
25' See supra notes 194-198 and accompanying text.
2"6 See supra notes 194-198 and accompanying text.
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is likely to feel more comfortable skiing with the prosecution's expert.
who appears more confident in his evaluation of the defendant. 287
Empirical evidence from jurors shows that they find psychiatric
experts to be very convincing—hut generally only when they are pre-
sented by the prosecution.288 In other words, juries believe the experts
who seem completely convinced that the defendant will wreak terrible
violence and murder if he or she is again unleashed on society—or
jurors are simply playing it safe because the defense experts cannot
offer a guarantee that the defendant will never again be violent. 289
The fact that psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness are
very persuasive and prejudicial to a jury would not be relevant if it.
were not also true that these predictions are no more reliable than
the flip of a coin. 290 Numerous studies conducted over decades have
confirmed that psychiatric professionals are not accurate in predict-
ing future dangerousness. 291
Dr. James Grigson presents an example of everything that. is
wrong with psychiatric predicdons of future dangerousness. 292 His
predictions are sometimes based not on actual examinations of the
defendants, but on long, drawn out hypothetical questions. 293 Time
after time, case after case, defendant after defendant, he uses the
same language to present the same diagnosis: the defendant is the
worst kind of sociopath—on a scale of one to ten, the defendant
would be a ten plus; the defendant has no conscience; it does not
matter to the defendant who he kills or what property lie destroys; the
defendant is one hundred percent certain to kill again; and there is
no known cure or treatment for the defendant's condition. 294
The problem with these canned predictions, besides the fact that
Dr. Grigson does not seem to individualize his diagnoses, is that he
has been wrong repeatedly.295 His methods have been condemned by
judges and fellow psychiatrists alike as unethical, and more impor-
tantly, inaccurate. 290 He was expelled from the American Psychiatric
281 See supra notes 194-198 and accompanying text.
288 See supra notes 199-211 and accompanying text.
288 See supra notes 190-206 and accompanying text.
290 See e.g., Ennis & Litwack, supra note 214, at 737; sec also supra notes 213-242 and ac-
companying text.
291 See supra notes 213-242 and accompanying text.
292 See supra notes 8-23 and accompanying text.
293 See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880,918-19 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
294 See supra note 10.
295 Sec supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
299 See e.g., supra notes 14,19-21 and accompanying text.
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Association for these methods and his bravado. 297
 Yet, just. this one
psychiatric expert has played a significant role in 'the convictions of an
enormous portion of the Texas death row. 298
That. statutes requiring determinations of future dangerousness
allow the introduction of psychiatric expert predictions, like those of
Dr. Grigson, clearly exposes the fact that arbitrariness and caprice in
the administration of the death penalty have not been expunged. 299
The Court, therefore, should get back on the track of Furman, Gregg,
and Woodson, and return to the notion that death is different. and ju-
ries require reliable evidence in order not to produce arbitrary and
capricious sentence determinations.
CONCLUSION
The Court was correct in Furman, Gregg, and Woodson. Death is
different, One does not need the Court to reveal this principle, how-
ever; common sense and intuition lead to the same conclusion. Be-
cause the death penalty is so extreme—and utterly final, the Court
also correctly determined that heightened standards of reliability and
accuracy should be used when determining the admissibility of evi-
dence at the sentencing phases of capital trials. The Court should
never have veered from this interpretation of the Eighth Amendment
as it did in Barefoot. In the Dauber! decision, the Court emphasized the
need for reliability in expert testimony, this time in the federal civil
setting. With this decision, the Court seems to have found the path
back toward its Furman, Gregg, and Woodson. Eighth Amendment juris-
prudence. The Court should follow this path toward the finding that
psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness in capital cases are a
violation of the Eighth Amendment because they are unreliable and
inaccurate and lead to arbitrary and capricious results.
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